Dio come essere?

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LA VERITÀ SUBLIME DEL NOME DI DIO
(pp. 11-22)

ABSTRACT

In the Holy Scriptures God calls itself Ego sum qui sum. *What is the admiration (*admiratio*) for this* sublimis veritas *that Thomas expresses? He uses a rigorous transcription:* Dei essentia est suum esse *(S.c.G. I, cap. 22). The being that is God is its being, i.e. a being preached only upon Itself, or that actually doesn't indeed properly preach itself. God's essence – Aquinas repeats – is unknowable, and it is unknowable because it is its being and its being transcends any other being. But it is provable. Each of the five ways, considering the being of things under different aspects, can be interpreted as a contribution to the identification of the divine being's singularity. At the end of each way, Aquinas proves the existence of a* suppositum *about whom the meaning of God included by Revelation can be asserted. Such* suppositum *is, for example, the being which does not become, that to which the way which questions the structure of the becoming being leads. And similarly for the other ways. The singularity of the divine being is what is indicated by the rational ways that meet at an un-founded transcendence as opposed to the being of things, which in their singularity, have in common the soundness (to be founded) of their being.*

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ARGOMENTI ARISTOTELICI CONTRO L'ESISTENZA DI UN ESSERE PER ESSENZA
(pp. 23-36)

ABSTRACT

Aristotle argues against the possibility that being is the essence of anything in An. post. *II 7, 92 b 13-14, a passage already quoted by Anscombe and Geach in* Three Philosophers. *In* Metaph. *III 4, 1001 a 4-b 1, Aristotle, discussing the thesis of Pythagoreans and Plato, refuses the existence of a Being, whose essence would be «Being itself» and «One itself», showing that it should have as a consequence the monism of Parmenides. The famous passage of* Metaph. *II 1, 993 b 23-31 (the causality of maximum), often used in favour of a* maxime ens, *has to be interpreted in a different way. Thomas Aquinas, when speaks of God as an* esse ipsum, *does not mean* esse *as existence, but refers to the* esse *of God.*

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LA CONSTRUCTION DE L'ONTOTHÉOLOGIE
(pp. 39-57)

ABSTRACT

This critical appraisal, on a historical and philological point of view, deals with Heidegger's elaboration, during his fellowship in Marburg, of the idea of an "ontotheological constitution" of Metaphysics. It aims at showing how, within an implicit debate with Paul Natorp and Werner Jaeger, the author of Sein und Zeit, toke a stand in much debated issues concerning unity and coherence in Aristotle's Metaphysics, particularly in the following books: Gamma, Epsilon, Kappa. Heidegger's stroke of genius consisted in 1) extending to the whole western metaphysics an embarassment (Verlegenheit) specific to the aristotelian project; 2) transforming textual difficulties into elements of a structural or constitutionnal determination; 3) lastly, suggesting an articulation with what he himself established as an "ontological difference".

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DIO CON L'ESSERE. DI NUOVO MARTIN HEIDEGGER
(pp. 58-67)

ABSTRACT

The paper analyzes a true "double bind" in Heidegger's relationship with the metaphysical tradition and, in particular, with the history of philosophical "onto-theo-logy". For Heidegger the metaphysical tradition is both a fundamental reference and a critical counterpart. An example of Heidegger's ambiguity on this topic can be found in his discussion and use of the concept of God, e.g. in Heidegger's interpretation of Hölderlin and in his Beiträge zur Philosophie.

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(pp. 71-89)

ABSTRACT

The essay examines Hegel's rehabilitation of the proofs of God's existence, highlighting the deep interest of Hegel to the difference between an sit *and* quid sit, *or between being and thinking. In this difference the German philosopher sees the Christian-modern competence to distinguish subjectivity as free self-consciousness. God's being as spirit is understandable by Hegel only as integration of this freedom in the Self revealing nature of the divine.*

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PROBLEMI METAFISICI DELL'ANTI-SCETTICISMO DI HEGEL. UN'ANALISI ROSMINIANA E UNA PROSPETTIVA "ALTRA" SU "DIO COME ESSERE"
(pp. 90-106)

ABSTRACT

The article shows that Rosmini's idea of being is the renewal of Leibniz's argument after Kant. With this strategy, Rosmini avoids the metaphysical problems of Hegel's aim to improve the ontological argument which could overcome the fourth antinomy of the transcendental dialectic. The sufficient reason of the necessary possibility is not God himself but the idea which impedes the Hegelian identification of infinite and finite. Only under the condition of finite, it enforces the infinite. In a Rosminian perspective, this is the only way to cope with that scepticism that Hegel wanted to suspend by integrating it as productive element in his system.

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*Q*UIDDITAS AND *A*NITAS AFTER FREGE
(pp. 109-118)

ABSTRACT

Aquinas made use of a distinction between two questions: the question quid est *and the question* an est. *There are two ways of answering the question "Quid est X". One way is to explain the meaning of the word "X"; the second is to give the essence or nature of X – a much more substantial task. Either answer may be called "The quiddity of X", for that is what a quiddity is, the answer to the question "quid est". A positive answer to th*e an *question always takes the form "est", but that word does not always have the same meaning. St Thomas makes a distinction between two kinds of* esse. esse *in one sense signifies something belonging to one of the ten categories, in another it is the kind of* esse *that answers the question "*an est*?" (is there...?). For* esse *in this sense there existed the Latin word* anitas. *Having compared Aquinas' teaching on* anitas *with Frege's use of the quantifier to express existence, I turn to consider the relation of being to essence. Is it the case that in creatures the two are distinct whereas in God they are the same? The life of creatures is a history of succession between powers and their actualisations. Nothing similar can be said about the life of God. But it does not necessarily follow that in God essence and being are identical: it may simply be that the distinction is inapplicable.*

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San Tommaso sulla natura e sulle implicazioni della semplicità divina
(pp. 119-139)

ABSTRACT

Aquinas holds that God is omnino simplex. *He also holds that God's simplicity has as corollaries the identity of God with His essence, the identity of God with His existence, and the identity of God with His perfections. For reasons I try to explain, I think that the alleged corollaries are highly problematic, but are not corollaries of the affirmation itself.*

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L'onto-teologia dopo Heidegger
(pp. 216-239)

ABSTRACT

This paper summarizes the discussion about the overtaking of ontotheology in the contemporary philosophy after Heidegger (E. Levinas and J.-L. Marion). The author maintains that the attempts of thinking God «over being» or «without being» have to be compared in a deeper way with the conception of Seyn als Ereignis *by Heidegger. This perspective can suggest the possibility of thinking God with being in a not metaphysical (post-metaphysical) view.*

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TWO APPROACHES TO DIVINE SIMPLICITY. REPLY TO ANTHONY KENNY AND CHRISTOPHER HUGHES
(pp. 157-164)

ABSTRACT

This paper revolves around a common facet of Anthony Kenny's and Christopher Hughes's papers in this volume. The many differences between their papers notwithstanding, Kenny's and Hughes' overall approach to simplicity is basically the same; I call it the "phenomenology-plus-restriction" strategy. If we discard it in favour of another (the "constructive") strategy, divine simplicity might appear in a more plausible light, even if there is still a price to pay.

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ONTOLOGIA E METAFISICA ALCUNI SPUNTI DALLA GNOSEOLOGIA PURA DI GIUSEPPE ZAMBONI
(pp. 165-171)

ABSTRACT

The pure gnoseology *of Giuseppe Zamboni (1875-1950) suggests the distinction between various meanings of being: being-there, essence, and act of being; analogously to the distinction proposed by Anthony Kenny between* anitas, quidditas, *and being. For this reason, the metaphysics of being-there, that is a metaphysics of the existence in general, must be carefully distinguished from the metaphysics of the act of being, which is based on the ontological constitution of beings we experience. Only then, will it be possible to avoid the accusation of* ontotheology, *which has its own essential paradigm in the ontological argument.*

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HEIDEGGER E LA *QUESTIONE* ONTOTEOLOGICA
(pp. 172-179)

ABSTRACT

Starting from the relations between J.F. Courtine and A. Fabris, the short essay examines the question of metaphysics as onto-theology in Heidegger's philosophy. The theological problem revolves around Heideggerian Denkweg, starting from the early works in which the presence of Aristotle, Paul of Tarsus, Augustine, Luther and Kierkegaard are key. The metaphysical problem of the divine and the sacred emerges in the courses dedicated to Hölderlin, in Nietzsche's "death of God" and in the thought on the "last God" in the Beiträge. But it is in the Conference on Identität und Differenz that clearly outlines the onto-theological constitution of metaphysics. If God is present in philosophy as causa sui only a "step back" (Schritt zurück) in thought allows you to see the authentic difference between Be and being.

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Verlegenheit metafisica. Un'ambiguità heideggeriana
(pp. 180-187)

ABSTRACT

Heidegger identifies in the double form of metaphysics a not yet thought unit: Ontotheology. In this way, however, the risk is to force metaphysics within the limits of an interpretative unitarity. Reflecting on Heidegger's analysis, this paper aims to return on Verlegenheit as structural condition of metaphysics, that is alternative to Heideggerian reductionism. Verlegenheit expresses the tension that animates metaphysics; the intrinsic duality of the relationship between Being and beings. Simplify Verlegenheit means falling in ambiguity.

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(pp. 188-205)

ABSTRACT

The editorial conclusion to the special issue is divided into three parts. The first part addresses the question of whether the aim of the Lugano conference and of this special issue has been met, namely the aim of providing the opportunity for philosophers of the analytic and continental tradition to gather together and interact with each other on the topic of God as Being. The second part identifies some converging responses as well as some fundamental disagreements as regards the question "Is God Being itself?" that have emerged during the Lugano conference. The third part puts forward a new reading of Aquinas' metaphysics of being, which may allow us to reduce disagreement between the continental and the analytic tradition. In particular, the third part suggests a conception of being as "second act", i.e. as what nowadays would be called an "event". This conception of being as event may allow us to go beyond the contrast between being and subjectivity as well as the contrast between existing and occurring.

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IL FILOSOFO, IL SOFISTA, IL MALE E LA *OMOÌOUSIA TO THEÒ* NEL *TEETETO*
(pp. 209-228)

ABSTRACT

I will discuss the main thesis Plato attributes to Protagoras in his Teethetus*, and his own critique, in order to give a new possible interpretation of 167 a. The thesis amounts to the following: a) Phenomenalism in defining knowledge as* aisthesis*; b) Utilitarianism in practical life; c) Conventionalism in politics; d) Relativism in ethics. In order to save Protagoras (167 d) Plato lastly goes beyond the possibility Protagoras could hold that in ethical and political life everybody is* autarkes *on his own judgment or* phronesis *(169 d 5-8). Therefore, his philosophical position could be a* pluralistic *one and not a relativistic one, and hence one could distinguish expertise as* techne *from practical or ethical wisdom,* anthropine kai politike sophia. *But this argumentation fails because the existence of evil, to escape which we are forced into the* omoiousia to theo *expounded in the "digression on rhetoric" (172 b 7-8). We do not believe the passus is a digression on rhetoric, but instead the main point of the dialogue, because he shows the only real possibility of confuting Protagoras in* referring *to the main problem of* omoiousia to theo*, whose meaning was expounded in* Republic III.

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GUSTAVO BONTADINI E LA METAFISICA. IL PENSIERO MODERNO E L'ATTUALISMO GENTILIANO COME "INTRODUZIONE ALLA METAFISICA"
(pp. 229-245)

ABSTRACT

Gustavo Bontadini's reflection on metaphysics and its status as incontrovertible knowledge, is considered in this essay with regard to the argument that modern philosophy and, even more, Giovanni Gentile's actualism, constitute a real "introduction to metaphysics". The final part of the paper presents the objection that was made by Emanuele Severino concerning this issue and, with reference to some of the author's previous writings, suggests some lines of thought which are intended to better appreciate the theoretical proposal of Bontadini.

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TEMPO OGGETTIVO E TEMPO SOGGETTIVO NEL PENSIERO DI VLADIMIR JANKÉLÉVITCH
(pp. 246-261)

ABSTRACT

This article aims to present and analyse Vladimir Jankélévitch's theory of time. Firstly, it shows that the subject of time is present in almost all works of Jankélévitch because of three philosophical reasons. Secondly, it considers the heritage of Bergsonian conception of duration and the influence of Schelling's perspective on Jankélévitch's elaboration of this theme. Thirdly, this paper considers the relation between being and becoming in Jankélévitch's philosophy, in order to demonstrate that there are two different levels of time: the ontological time and the anthropological time. Finally, through the analysis of the problem of irreversibility and the notion of kairos, *this article tries to show that Jankélévitch conceives the relation between ontological time and anthropological time as a relation of mutual belonging.*

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POSSIBLE WORLDS, ZOMBIES AND TRUTH MACHINES
(pp. 262-283)

ABSTRACT

The subject of zombies is one of the most discussed and controversial topics of philosophy of mind. In this paper I will first examine the main argument of zombies, providing a summary of the current discussion. Then I will introduce a thought experiment, an epistemic window on a metaphysical scenario. By the thought experiment I will argue that zombies are logically impossible. Further I will discuss another recent epistemic window. Finally I will provide some other logical consideration to prove that intentionality is not reducible to the cognitive functional aspects of the mind and that, moreover, the subjective recognition of semantic contents is necessary in order to consider as sensical the verbal behaviour of a zombie.

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ABSTRACT

In the thought of Giordano Bruno, anthropology results from both metaphysical and mystical questions: in fact, man is placed in a metaphysical scheme providing for an original cause, which produces the reality as a whole. On the level of his external existence, man is placed between the original cause and vicissitude, whereas, as far as his inner nature is concerned, he is split between the light of the soul and the fallacy of the body. The latter, however, allows the human individuation of the anima mundi*: on the one hand, body represents a heavy burden, obstructing the way to excellence; on the other hand, it is a constitutive element of the entire human structure. Furthermore, human body, being the "contour" of the embodied soul, i.e. a liminar element subordinated to the soul, but being simultaneously able to relate the latter to the vicissitude, plays a specific role in the affirmation of the excellence of the human being: the divine man actually remains within the vicissitude, displaying his magnitude in a form which comprises body as one of its essential and constitutive elements.*

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DALLA «COSA IN SÉ» ALL'«OGGETTO TRASCENDENTALE». PRINCIPIO FINALE E *SCHEMA* DEL GIUDIZIO SINTETICO A PRIORI
(pp. 303-317)

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this essay is to suggest an interpretation of both the character and the role of the «transcendental Object» into the ontological project, that Kant proposes in the Critique of pure reason. By stressing the undoubted ties between this last and the concept of the «Thing in itself», I propose to consider these two concepts as two sides of the same coin or, better, as two moments involved in the same process: the ontological judgment. According to this, I'm going to show that, if the concept of the Thing in itself acts as a final principle *of the synthetic judgment a priori, the transcendental Object takes the role of «schema» for the measurement of the general objectivity of the phenomena. The proposed thesis is that the transcendental Object, in order to do this, must have not only a conceptual form, but also a «transcendental content»: the synthesis a priori of the* pure possible intuition*; i.e. space and time.*

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INCONTRADDITTORIO E PRINCIPIO DI NON CONTRADDIZIONE. UNA DISTINZIONE TEORETICAMENTE
NECESSARIA
(pp. 318-339)

ABSTRACT

The objective of this paper is to show first of all the formal character of the principle of non-contradiction, formulated by Aristotle and taken up by Severino. Second, we will attempt to demonstrate the need to distinguish «the uncontradictable» by the principle of non-contradiction. «The uncontradictable» cannot be determined, because its absolute value would be denied. However, it cannot even be denied, because it is the condition of intelligibility of the negation. It also constitutes the reason why the contradiction proves its self-contradictory character. The contradicting itself of the contradiction finds expression in some very significant steps of the work of Hegel, which are analyzed to show how the phenomenology of logic, which is horizontal, is based on the logos, which emerges as an act, by its nature vertical.

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Nichilismo e intersoggettività nel pensiero di Guglielmo Gallino
(pp. 343-349)

ABSTRACT

The author examines the main topics of Guglielmo Gallino's book, Sense and nothingness. *An answer to nihilism. Gallino tries to overcome nihilism on the basis of a theory of intersubjectivity, which has its roots in Whitehead, Husserl and Paci, and of a conception of philosophy as a general theory of relations. Gallino develops his thesis in reference to the idealistic Subject and to Ontology, in a large historical context which comprehends not only Nietzsche and Heidegger but also Kant Schelling and Rosmini. This allows the author to enter into a dialogue with him, which can be considered enriching for both parties.*

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Scienza e filosofia in Talete e negli altri Presocratici. Riflessioni intorno a un nuovo libro di Livio Rossetti
(pp. 350-361)

ABSTRACT

The note describes and discusses the central thesis of the volume by L. Rossetti, La filosofia non comincia con Talete*, according to which the technical notion of "philosophy", as it is still understood today, only came into being at the time of Plato, and its backdating to the time of Thales and the so-called* physiologoi *is to be ascribed to an arbitrary construction by Aristotle and Plato himself. The strength and richness of the arguments put forward in the book are highlighted, but at the same time some objections and critical reservations are expressed.*

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METAFISICA ED ETERNITÀ. SU UN'OPERA RECENTE DI LEONARDO MESSINESE E SULL'IMPLICAZIONE AUREA DIFESA DA EMANUELE SEVERINO
(pp. 362-371)

ABSTRACT

The idea (present in L. Messinese, L'apparire di Dio *[2015], and again in E. Severino,* Dike *[2015]) that nothing has the possibility of not to be, closes the way of metaphysics in general. This happens, even when the weight of negativity falls on the alternation of appearing and disappearing, that we find into the Unit-of Experience, but that we cannot find in God. Basically, that assumption must reject the possibility to affirm that something is not any other thing, or the possibility to affirm that something is limited by any other thing. In this way, nothing can be distinguished by any thing, because, to distinguish something by something else, we need to say that the first thing that we consider (x) is not all the other things that we consider as different from it (not-x). So, more fundamentally, in that idea we find a self-contradiction that logic and phenomenology must refuse.*