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INTRODUZIONE
(pp. 406-422)

ABSTRACT

Introduction is the editorial by M.F. Sciacca, which appeared in the first issue of Giornale di Metafisica (January-February 1946), here republished. It opens with an intense and dramatic reminder of the human and social climate immediately after the war and the new responsibilities of thought faced with the hopes of rebirth and the enormous task of the moral and material reconstruction of the country. It offers a brief assessment of the situation of philosophy in Italy and in a strong connection with the previous considerations expounds the guidelines of the journal, which is meant as a reference journal and one for critical discussion between the different souls of Christian Spiritualism, especially in Italy and in France, but with all-round attention to developments in the philosophical debate of the moment.
ABSTRACT

It is the editorial by N. Incardona in issue 1/1982 year IV of the Nuova serie of Giornale di Metafisica, written when he became the editor of the journal. Starting from a famous Latin motto, which emphasizes the ability to work in favour not of oneself but of others, and reprising some motifs from the 1946 Introduction by Sciacca, the author stresses that the new series should take upon itself the task of re-proposing in an original way, in a different cultural and human situation, the strength of the reasons which had led to the birth of Giornale di Metafisica. Commitment to going deeper into the permanent issues of philosophy and metaphysics in particular must be able to blend with the ability to follow equally intensely the chronicle of the “days” of philosophy and the bond between philosophy and time.
ABSTRACT

Neo-Platonism is present, even in a “diluted” form, all along the history of Philosophy until our day – we may remember for instance the great German philosopher Schelling – but the great chain of Christian Neo-Platonism disappears progressively after the beginning of so-called “modern philosophy”. The crucial thesis of this article is that it is possible to try a prosecution of the Neo-Platonism mentioned as a proposal for the future of metaphysics. A fundamental point in this regard is to discuss the idea of the purely “intellectual” condition of philosophy, coming back to the “philo” character of philosophy.
ABSTRACT

What is Metaphysics? And why does philosophy as metaphysical thought seem in crisis today? The paper attempts to answer these questions by developing three theoretical points. The main problem of metaphysics is the problem of mediation: this is the first thesis. This assumption is discussed in a second step by reconstructing some moments in the history of Western Philosophy: above all the idea of “mediation” in Plato, Aristotle and in the early Christian Thought. Finally, the paper sees the contemporary crisis of metaphysics as the crisis of an articulated and multilateral idea of “relationship”. At the end of the essay this idea is amply discussed and regenerated.
ABSTRACT

Metaphysics seeks to highlight the unifying principle of our experiences, both of the world and of ourselves. This research, however, seems vain because it is impossible. But it is necessary and feasible, if the norms of reason are not its sole condition. The philosophical tradition actually distinguishes “reason” and “intellect”. Intellect is not merely endowed with a cognitive function; it is more radically a unitive attitude revealed by reflexive experience. Attention, an original affection, is the first condition of metaphysical knowledge.
ABSTRACT

In this article analytic criticism to traditional metaphysics starting from Wittgenstein and Carnap’s Logical Empiricism is investigated out of the notion of “therapy” which should characterise any enterprise of purifying scientific language from metaphysical pseudo-concepts and meanings. The main idea is that any version of such criticism, based on the notion of “overcoming”, can produce a new version of “hybridised” metaphysics and not a mere removal of metaphysics from the domain of meaningfulness. This hypothesis lies at the centre of a historical survey which recognizes the Quine-Carnap dispute as a crucial point out of which metaphysics enters productively the realm of analytic philosophy. The key notion of what is here called the analytic reformation of metaphysics is the separation, which Quine made explicitly possible, of metaphysics from ontology and the recognition, which came as a later consequence of this separation, of the latter both as logical and epistemic basis for any metaphysical theory. Another key point which constitutes the ground for the analytic reformation of Metaphysics is dismissal of the idea of an absolute and ultimate totality encompassing all things as possible objects of metaphysical inquiry. These two ideas can be shown as definitely acquired by the most contemporary metaphysical positions belonging to the analytic context but even according to non-analytic thinkers who recognize the need for metaphysics to reshape itself in order to pursue epistemic success.
ABSTRACT

Only the recognition of “truth” elements for metaphysical knowledge will be able to guide philosophical research to effectively draw on the metaphysical contribution in the moral and cultural life of our time. In line with the above conviction, in this essay I intend to expound a synthesis of personal rethinking of metaphysics around two central themes: the first is the relationship between becoming and metaphysical knowledge, about which a series of details are introduced concerning the standard form of classical metaphysics; the second is the blending of two distinct, but complementary concepts of metaphysics appearing in the philosophical thought of the twentieth century in Italy. The title of the article, “original metaphysics”, intends to briefly express the result which the author has reached in the rethinking of metaphysical knowledge.
ABSTRACT

Rethinking metaphysics, after its rejection by the twentieth-century philosophical thought, seems to be an attempt to exhume a way of looking at reality that has finally ended. At the same time, however, giving it up perhaps means violating its nature. Metaphysics, in fact, in its specificity, gives an account of itself and of its own negation, or rather of one through the other. And this is because it guarantees its own identity independently from historical contingencies. And then, perhaps, the attempt to rethink metaphysics is justified because it is still possible to make the original possibilities of metaphysical thought explicit. This is possible, however, as evidenced by Heidegger and Wittgenstein, in a way that takes the form of a change of attitude that allows us to wonder in front of the world and welcome it in all its ontological consistency.
ABSTRACT

This article explores the condition of metaphysics after the consummation, with Nietzsche, of the classic antithesis of values and his critique of the idea of truth. Georg Simmel, strengthened by his reading of Goethe, Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, also with reference to the error theory of his master Georges Canguilhem, are the cornerstones of a reflection on the immanence and its self-sufficiency, which aims to outline a ‘metaphysics of this-side’, rooted in the wandering and in the error-making which is constitutive of life. The conclusion highlights the contrast between this essential character of life and the cultural forms of the present, dominated by the global model of zero-defects quality assurance and the ‘technologies of the (quantified) self’.
ABSTRACT

Heidegger strongly emphasized the problem of foundation in his early confrontation with current prospects and the fate of metaphysical inquiry. In addition to the two main terms of the grounding process (fundieren, gründen), he highlights a third term (stiften) from his own interpretation of Friedrich Hölderlin’s philosophical poetry. The article analyzes the metaphysical structure of institution (Stiftung). It shows whether and to what extent this conceptual framework repeats the temporal structure of human existence on a historical and meta-ontological level, and the way in which Heidegger attempts, almost unsuccessfully, to adopt it in order to start a new experience of metaphysics, and at the same time to rethink its tradition.
ABSTRACT

The notion of res cogitans has constituted a privileged critical objective of readings of modern subjectivity in a deconstructionist key, coming to act as a term in which there seem to merge, in a sort of fatal alliance, hyperconscientialism, reification, solipsism and everything the contemporary culture attributes to bad metaphysics, or even to metaphysics tout court. However, also and above all when it is understood within the ontologically strong meaning of substantia, the Cartesian reference to res cogitans does not necessarily denote the simple outcome of the I folding back into alleged and undisturbed autonomy. It also proves to be the locus in which what is challenged is precisely the idea that the I-subject, in the sense of that evidence that holds together the cogito and the sum, concerns a self-concussed form of self-founded knowledge.
ABSTRACT

This article deals with the relationship between history and philosophy involved in the practice of philosophical genealogy. Genealogy is far from being a simple notion. The use of this concept by Nietzsche and Foucault started a debate in the academic world that has not yet been resolved. This article’s goal is to contribute to the discussion by considering a new facet. I make the claim that the “philosophical-genealogical” paradigm was created by Hegel. Hegel’s genealogy is a narrative of the history of spirit that aims to achieve the historical conditions of the possibility of freedom. That primordial genealogical paradigm allows us to define genealogy as a way to represent the convergence between logos and genesis. I will justify this claim by examining three genealogical paradigms, those of Hegel, Nietzsche and Foucault. These thinkers are not arbitrarily linked: the latter two are trying to escape from the first. But the question is: have they in fact escaped Hegel? My thesis in this article is that the practice of genealogy – at least in the way Nietzsche and Foucault understand it – has not entirely abandoned Hegelian metaphysical conditions. This comparison is relevant to clarify the complex relationship between historical discourses and philosophical concepts.
Contemporary analytic metaphysics insists on the transcendental status which has always characterized metaphysics since its Aristotelian origin. As soon as metaphysics has to declare its topic, it also has to expound the conditions of possibility of its own knowledge. Hence, metaphysics is at the same time a “meta-metaphysics”. Following such a classic proceeding, contemporary analytic metaphysics promotes a strong recovery of Aristotle’s ontology (Lowe, Armstrong), but it seems to be also very close to the Suarezian turn by an author like van Inwagen.
ABSTRACT

The article discusses, also in the light of other critical contributions in this regard, the unprecedented perspective opened up on metaphysics and its history in the recent volume Ritrattazioni della metafisica by L. Samonà, with the intention also of highlighting its planning aspects in relation to a possible future of metaphysical research. An endeavour is made to isolate the most original and fruitful aspects of the theoretical approach introduced by the author with the concept of “retractation”, with particular reference to the radicalisation it entails of the role played, starting from the Greek origin of metaphysical thought, by the notion of “negative”, made thematic and differently valued in the modern tradition of dialectics (Hegel) and in contemporary philosophy (Heidegger).
ABSTRACT

Can the metaphysics today still have a future and concern the human being, having to deal with his future? Can it also do it in the way to be even able to respond to what seems, on the one hand, the fundamental question of the individual and, on the other hand, that which philosophy generally less effectively managed to cope: what should I do? The intent of this paper, in its limited nature, is to show how metaphysics has a chance of fundamental development in the radicalization of self, originally practical and builder of the ethics in proper sense, which has its roots in Kant as metaphysica specialis and which Heidegger has suggested, though not developed, as metaphysics of existence or metaontology, namely as the necessary overturn of the fundamental ontology.
ABSTRACT

Is it up to this writing to merit the reproach of “irrationality”? The author moves from a need – rethinking metaphysics – that, in his opinion, is presenting itself with more intensity and seriousness than in the past. However, he does not follow immediately the path of the overcoming of metaphysics [Überwindung der Metaphysik], but – re-reading Being and Time and some other Heidegger’s texts – he tries to focus on the origin, the ἀρχή of the “metaphysical” thought within the insuppressible bond with πάθος. Starting from the analysis of the relational and revelatory character of the attunement and the discovery of the darkness which wraps the Being-there (Da-sein), the mentions of Angst, of solitude, of uncanniness as the most original phenomenon inherent to the Being-in-the-world – as well as the reference to the character of conscience as a call of Da-sein, finding itself in the ground of its uncanniness – would confirm the intimate, essential relationship between the highest expressions of our metaphysical thinking and our constitutive finitude. Finally, the mentions related to the plurality and historicity of the basic dispositions of philosophy (wonder, joy, boredom, melancholy...), and conclusive blinking to metaphysics as homesickness express also, with the anxiety of finitude, the need to turn from the love of wisdom to the wisdom of love.
ABSTRACT

From the Principle of Sufficient Reason to the Justification of the Existent. The Displacement of the Fundamental Question of Metaphysics in Emmanuel Levinas. In Levinas’ philosophical works it’s possible to find a radical rewriting of the metaphysical question and a new definition of the relationship between metaphysics and ontology. Levinas gives a phenomenological reading of the fundamental question of metaphysics through a passage from the idea of ontological difference to the concepts of separation and creation. In this way, metaphysics is associated with transcendence and otherness; ethics is thought of as first philosophy: the metaphysical question is not “to be or not to be”, but the problem of evil and the justification of the existent.