Intuizione ed emotività
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Orientarsi nel mondo. A proposito di intuizione ed emotività
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ABSTRACT

Orientarsi nel mondo. A proposito di intuizione ed emotività is the editorial by A. Cicatello, which appeared in the second issue of Giornale di Metafisica (July-December 2017), about the theme of Intuition and Emotivity.
ABSTRACT

In this paper I try to dispel some ambiguities concerning the notion of intuition and advance a thesis on its necessity. After an introduction (§ 1) in which I briefly talk about the ostracism that intuition has suffered in many areas of modern philosophy, in the first part (sections 2-4) I work toward a closer definition of it. I isolate at least three different meanings of the term relevant for our discussion. In the second part (§ 5) I give an historical reconstruction to show how we pass from a noetic (especially in Plato and Aristotle) to a sensible (esp. in Kant) understanding of intuition. My thesis is simple enough: intuition is not the other of thinking (rationality, philosophy, concepts) but its indispensable complement.
ABSTRACT

The aim of this study is to show how, in phenomenology, the relationship between solipsism and alterity is closely connected to the two concepts of matter and temporality. Openness to the Other has in fact two aspects: the first considers sensation and a perceived property as being endowed with a motor physiognomy; the second consists in considering the past as prior to the present, or the now. The subjectivity that emerges is temporal and to a large degree impersonal. In it the representational structure, or map-producing activity, is to a large degree reconfigured in favor of the motor and behavioral dimension. Similarly, focus on the essential character of subjectivity is progressively replaced by a search for processes of individuation starting from a common, intercorporeal and integrated ontological dimension.
ABSTRACT

In this paper I claim that, in Kant’s theory of sensibility, the pure forms of intuition exercise a proto-synthetic activity upon the manifold, thus properly allowing its givenness. By this I mean that the receptivity of all sensible representations entails a spatio-temporal framing. Such a formal but still sensible synthesis, whose necessity Kant clarifies in the Transcendental Aesthetic, corresponds to the activity called synopsis to which Kant refers in the first edition of the Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding. Understanding this correspondence means to understand 1) that receptivity and passivity are not synonymous; 2) that a possible synthesis does not coincide with a necessary unity. The categories can therefore be applied to intuitions insofar as every intuition allows the givenness of a manifold by giving to it a spatio-temporal shape.
ABSTRACT

Transcendental Intuition, Transcendental Knowledge and System in Hegel’s Differenzschrift. In the Differenzschrift, the notion of «transcendental intuition» plays a key role both in the critique of Kant and Fichte and in Hegel’s own position. Firstly, I will focus on this concept (which is only employed in the Differenzschrift), on the new meaning of “transcendental” and on its relation to Hegel’s Fichte and Kant critique. In this early work, transcendental intuition is the way Hegel conceives a new kind of logic that grounds and explains the logic of intellect and reflection. I will then show that such «unconscious» logic is needed to establish a comprehensive knowledge of the world («transcendental knowledge»). Finally, I will point out the relevance of the notion of system and I will claim that, according to the Differenzschrift, philosophy is only a part of it.
ABSTRACT

This paper deals with Plato’s elaboration of the topos of the inspired poet in the Ion. After briefly discussing Plato’s inquiry into the notion of techne, the author explores the nature and function of poetic inspiration in the context of the rhapsode’s performance. The author claims that inspiration consists in an imaginative process of emotional absorption and is grounded on specific modes of psychophysical stimulation, from which aesthetic pleasure stems. The author also claims that the emphasis Plato puts on the somatosensory dimension of poetic experience contributes to an understanding of emotions as psychophysical experiences and represents Plato’s main argument for radicalizing the antithesis between techne and enthousiasmós.
ABSTRACT

After an introduction in section 1 to the relevance of Aristotle in Kolnai’s phenomenological method, section 2 explains why Kolnai thinks that disgust cannot be understood either as a form of fear or as a merely visceral reaction (like nausea). Section 3 examines the role of proximity in fear and, by contrasting Kolnai’s and Aristotle’s accounts, it discloses their deep similarity. Section 4 is devoted to proximity in disgust and to the ambivalence that characterizes this emotion. Section 5 shows why proximity has both a subjective and an objective meaning in the case of disgust. On the one hand, it characterizes the relationship between the subject of the emotion and the disgusting object (which is felt to be too close). On the other hand, it refers to the constitution of the disgusting object itself, and invites attraction and repulsion by putting us in touch with a world of transformation and decay towards which we feel deep affinity.
ABSTRACT

The aim of this article is to point out the gap between the notion of categorial intuition, which Husserl introduced in Sixth Logical Investigation, and the notion of eidetic seeing, which he analysed in the first paragraphs of Ideas i. To pursue my aim, I will firstly discuss Heidegger’s identification of these two notions. Secondly, I will insist on the difference between an intuition aimed to grasp the categorial forms of any object and, on the other hand, an intuition focused on the essential features of an individual object. Finally, I will explain why, in the transition from categorial to eidetic intuition, linguistic expression progressively loses the heuristic role it plays since First Logical Investigation in favour of some modifications of perception such as phantasy and imagination.
This paper discusses the phenomenological approach to the experience of pain, highlighting in the first place its ambiguity and indeed its enigmatic trait. The enigma of pain is well known to Wittgenstein, who shows, in his repeated discussions of the topic, that pain cannot be conceived simply as a private experience. Yet in Wittgenstein there is, in the last analysis, no way to address the peculiar relationship between feeling pain and feeling one’s own feeling pain. This issue is well known to Husserl, who derives his approach from the debate between Brentano and Stumpf. In his attempt to find an intermediate position between the two, Husserl broadens the meaning of experiencing pain. This can be seen in particular when taking into consideration what Husserl calls the Leib. In discussing this notion, the paper shows two possible interpretations of it, offering arguments in favor of the radical embodiment of consciousness.
ABSTRACT

Discussing the contemporary debate about the metaphysics of relations and structural realism, I analyse the philosophical significance of relational quantum mechanics (RQM). Relativising properties of objects (or systems) to other objects (or systems), RQM affirms that reality is inherently relational. My claim is that rqm can be seen as an instantiation of the ontology of ontic structural realism, for which relations are prior to objects, since it provides good reasons for the argument from the primacy of relation. In order to provide some evidence, RQM is interpreted focusing on its metametaphysics, in particular in relation to the very concept of relation, and to the meaning such concept assumes in the dispute between realism and antirealism.
ABSTRACT

This article proposes a philosophical way of thinking about the meaning of pain and its different semantic meanings: suffering, physical pain, spiritual grief, illness. The aim of this reflection attempt to highlight how grief is perceived, endured and to understand how it is expressed by language, being conscious of the inevitable discontinuity between language and life experiences. Therefore we are making referring to the more recent philosophical reflections, specifically the thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein which allows us to define and reach a better comprehension and definition of the logical impossibility to understand the grief using a “private language”. The use of ordinary language, everyday language, doesn’t express the real meaning of grief, but rather replaces it with a linguistic act that allows us to communicate it to others, which it is also the only way we have to live in touch with our selves. This transposition into common words, which makes possible the comprehension of grief, neither legitimates or justifies it, but rather, because of its spontaneity and immediacy, we should be reminds us of the ethic responsibility of the primary importance of being able to recognize that grief is unique and intolerable, each time as it were the first.
ABSTRACT

This article aims to investigate Descartes’ reflection on the science of the soul (scientia de anima) in order to place it within the previous debates. After having analyzed the main references on the soul and the body in Cartesian works, the article makes a comparison between Descartes and the Coimbra Jesuits’ comment on De anima in order to underline the new elements introduced by Descartes in the traditional debate. On the one hand, Descartes assigns to metaphysics a central role in dealing with the separate nature of the soul, that is, what he believed was its essence; on the other hand, Descartes ends up with identifying psychology with physiology, attributing the study of all the functions and properties that do not belong to the activity of the cogitatio to anatomy and physiology. The conclusion of the article tries to find the reasons, both apologetic and functional, for Descartes’ approach.
ABSTRACT

This paper aims to analyze the concept of temporality in Kierkegaard’s philosophy, with special attention to his book The concept of Anxiety (1844). On the whole, the paper consists of three parts. The first part of the paper provides an overview of the concept of Anxiety in Kierkegaard’s philosophy, in comparison to the other kierkegaardians writings. The second part of the paper is a philosophical comparison between Kierkegaard, Hegel and Trendelenburg on the concept of time and temporality, in order to show the originality of Kierkegaard’s critique against Hegel. The third part of the paper is a philosophical analysis and interpretation of Kierkegaard’s conception of temporality. In this part, a particular meaning of the concept of instant (Øjeblick) is proposed and some implications about the Kierkegaardian conception of redemption.
This essay intends to deepen the spiritual and metaphysical relevance of phenomenology. In this perspective the work by Edmund Husserl is very important because he showed the radical meaning of human experience of truth through the rise to eidetic vision. Both on personal and communitarian plane, the method of reduction and the path toward this vision bring to light the dynamic structure of a spiritual relationship between consciousness, phenomenon and essence. While the metaphysical plane concerns knowledge, the spiritual plane pertains to the way of life. Two works in particular are representative of this spiritual and metaphysical value of phenomenological method: we mean Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie and Cartesianische Meditationen. The essay recalls both the works and shows how in Husserl’s conception phenomenology is neither a complete metaphysics nor a post-metaphysical thought; rather it represents the spiritual opening of the path toward a rigorously grounded metaphysics.
The question of death is one of the main topics of Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit. Death, perceived as “the possibility of the sheer impossibility of Dasein”, reveals the impossibility as the extreme possibility, rather as Dasein’s ownmost chance. Not a case at all, it represents the end of all the possibilities of a finite Being, whose the self-appropriation overlaps with the “renouncing of itself”. In this regard, facing Heidegger’s papers, E. Levinas highlights that death must not be viewed as the possibility of impossibile – still a form of “to be able to” – but as the impossibility of possible (of every potentiality), i.e. as the overthrow of the sovreignty of subject. About the meaninglessness of everyone’s own death, dying for another person symbolizes the extreme sacrifice, in fact it means not to leave the one is going to be saved alone in front of death.
ABSTRACT

This essay aims to capture the influence of the American Rabbi and thinker Joseph B. Soloveitchik (1903-1993) and the impact of his thought upon the Jewish philosophies in the second part of the Twentieth century, both in Europe and in North America. It will show the originality of his approach to modernity and tradition, and underline his specific contribution to a “philosophy of the Halakhah”, understood as the essential condition for any Jewish philosophy of religion. The essay will also provide a criticism of Rav Soloveitchik’s concept of “untranslatability” of personal religious experiences.