ABSTRACT

Premessa is the editorial by Rosa Maria Lupo, which appeared in the first issue of Giornale di Metafisica (January-June 2019), about the theme of "Metametaphysics".
ABSTRACT

Metametaphysics makes its first appearance in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, as a part of the discipline contained in this treatise. Occupying five books, this part is first of all an examination of the metaphysics which is implicit in the common sense with the name of “wisdom” (sophia). The result of this examination is Aristotle’s definition of “first philosophy” as the “science of the first causes or principles”. Afterwards metametaphysics is a discussion, made by Aristotle, of the metaphysics practised by first philosophers until Plato. Thirdly, metametaphysics is Aristotle’s reflexion on the method of metaphysics and his discussion of the aporias concerning its unity. The solution of these aporias, proposed by Aristotle, is the distinction between two meanings of the object of metaphysics, i.e. being as being and its first causes. Finally metametaphysics is the explanation, offered by Aristotle, of the difference between metaphysics and other theoretical sciences, i.e. physics and mathematics.
ABSTRACT

According to van Inwagen, Varzi and others, the account of what there is (sometimes called “ontology”) does neither entail nor presuppose an account of its ultimate nature (sometimes called “metaphysics”). According to Schaffer and others, the account of what there is does neither entail nor presuppose an account of what grounds what, i.e., of what is fundamental and what is derived. I argue against both theses. Inasmuch as ontology is something more than a “chaotic enumeration”, it must require both a metaphysics and a theory of what is fundamental. The questions about what there is, what it is and what grounds what are thus just different aspects of one and the same question. Whatever first philosophy may be, Aristotle was right: it is one science, not the fusion of different components of which at least one is independent from the others.
ABSTRACT

In the last decades of the 19th century a great portion of Hegel’s scholarship concentrated on the question as to whether Hegel was a metaphysical or an anti-metaphysical thinker. The debate has seldom focused on which notion of “metaphysics” Hegel refers to in his work. Through an analysis of the shifts in the status of metaphysics throughout the development of Hegel’s thought, this article considers whether an original notion of metaphysics can be traced in Hegel’s philosophy. We will consider the notion of metaphysics, first, within the Jena System-Drafts and then within the mature system. Through an analysis of Hegel’s notion of “objective thought”, we will then concentrate on the transformation of metaphysics into logic, which is the foundation of the very idea of a “science of logic”, and on the passages where this transformation is achieved. In the conclusion, we will return to the question as to whether a notion of Hegelian metaphysics is possible.
ABSTRACT

In this short note I show that metaphysical views are intimately connected with views about logic; that is, views about what follows from what, and why. This is demonstrated by a number of case studies drawn from the history of logic and metaphysics. The connection between metaphysics and logic, once seen, is quite obvious. What to make of it is another matter. That question is raised, but not answered, at the end of the essay.
ABSTRACT

A metametaphysical perspective by no means signifies a final hegemony of metaphysics, conceived as a discipline at once formal and directive, which aim to replace the metaphysics of first intention. We undertake to show that we can not reduce the metaphysics of the constituent to that of the relation or vice versa and that a mixed metaphysics is inevitable, which considerably limits the scope and the interest of a metametaphysics. In this sense, this brief proposition returns to a new interpretation of the paradigmatic Plato/Aristotle couple and indeed contains a plea for Platonist relationalism, partly taken from within the metaphysics of Van Inwagen and Lowe.
ABSTRACT

Going beyond metaphysics does not make sense. However, it is possible to go below it, and thus radicalize Heidegger’s approach. He rethought the fundamental concepts of Greek thought in the sense of an ontology, starting with their ethical bedrock. Considering that it is not ontology, but ethics, that is fundamental, Levinas radicalizes the investigation. Nevertheless, he misses its meaning by naming it metaphysical and by setting it beyond being. Another approach to ethics is possible, starting from good, achieved, not as an idea to be contemplated, but as the object of our desires. To go below metaphysics is to re-found it, like ethics, on the human good.
ABSTRACT

In this paper, I present and defend a metaphysical position I call Lightweight Platonism. The core theses of Lightweight Platonism are: (i) There exist propositions, properties, and relations. (ii) Properties and relations are “alethic” or “proposition like” entities. That is, while propositions are things that are true or false (full stop), properties are things that are true or false of things, and relations are things that are true or false of pluralities of things. (iii) Propositions, properties, and relations are the only abstracta. (iv) All abstracta exist necessarily, and some properties and relations are capable of existing without being instantiated (without being true of anything or any things). (v) Properties and relations “abound” – there is, for example, such a property as that it is either green or not round (or “being either green or not round”). (vi) Abstracta are without causal powers or propensities – they can be neither agents nor patients. (vii) That an object has, or that two or more objects have, a certain property explains nothing about it or them. For example, if an apple is green, and thus has (or instantiates or exemplifies) the property greenness (if that it is green is true of it), its having that property does not explain the fact that it is green; if two apples both green, and thus both have greenness – and are thus of the same color –, their both having greenness does not explain the fact that they are of the same color.
ABSTRACT

The article focuses on the need for meta-theoretical reduction in metaphysics. It begins by examining the difficulty of controlling the over-production of philosophical research; then explores the external and internal reasons of redundancy in the field, and suggests some ideas for reducing redundancy in metaphysics.
ABSTRACT

Semantic compatibilism is a meta-philosophical strategy of reconciliation between our best philosophical theories and recalcitrant common sense beliefs. It states that a recalcitrant assertion of a common belief is reconciled with our theory in case it is shown that the proposition really expressed by the ordinary assertion is compatible with the theory. Semantic compatibilists traditionally have appealed to a series of semantic-pragmatic phenomena to justify this kind of reconciliation: from so-called “reconciling paraphrases” to contextual variation, from joint-carving quantifiers to loose talk. The main aim of semantic compatibilism, according to P. van Inwagen, is that of avoiding global scepticism: if we cannot trust our common sense, this means that our capacity of forming knowledge is globally damaged, so every revisionist metaphysician should also be a compatibilist. In our paper we criticise semantic compatibilism at this foundational level: on the one hand, we defend the view that being revisionist with respect to a certain area of discourse (for example, being eliminativists with respect to composite artefacts) does not lead necessarily to global scepticism, on the other we claim that it is just semantic compatibilism to be at risk of being a source of a sceptical attitude.
ABSTRACT

An ontological debate is a debate on what there is. A metaontological debate is a debate on how ontological debates should be carried out. Ontology is the discipline which addresses ontological debates, whereas metaontology addresses metaontological debates. In this work, we discuss the standard Quinean view in metaontology. We point out that alternatives to the Quinean position are available. We consider one of such alternative views, i.e. fictionalism in ontology, and we assess its costs.
We think of the world as consisting of objects, with properties and standing in relations. There are, to be sure, different views on what objects etc. there are, and on what their natures are. And some theorists want to subtract some elements from this picture. For example, the ontological nihilist says that there are no objects. But still, the view described is very much part of orthodoxy – so much so that one may need to be reminded that the view that the world consists of objects, with properties and standing in relations is, precisely, a view. I here investigate the possibility that this view is false: that there is what may be called alien structure. And I investigate the relationship between alien structure and some important themes from the history of analytic philosophy.
ABSTRACT

The paper starts with Adriano Fabris’ reflections on the theme of relationship in ethics and focuses on a particular topic: the role of the body. Moving from the need to address this aspect to an analysis of the new forms of negation of bodies, the essay reveals the way in which Hegel introduces the problem of the body in the elaboration of the ethical relationship. As is well known, in the “phenomenological figures” of the relationship, the philosopher point out the resistance that the body exerts in the construction of ethical discourse, but in the “logical figures” this resistance appears outdated. The essay proposes to show how the discourse of the “ontology of ambiguity” proposed by Fabris can offer an interesting point of comparison and a useful key of interpretation in the aporetic outcome of the young Hegel’s reflections on the body.
ABSTRACT

This paper aims at sketching a philosophical proposal, which can be called “philosophy of openness”. It is in fact a kind of metaphysics of relation, which, following the history of the dissolution of the modern subject, aims at reintroducing a strong sense of identity as open identity. Inspired by Sloterdijk’s suggestions, a new humanism can be thought of, provided a revision of the modern motto “knowledge is power”. The new intelligent technologies give rise to philosophical and ethical challenges, which cannot be faced using the traditionally dualistic conception of knowledge and technique, or the image of a subject as a self-evident fundament of comprehension and domination. Under the perspective of the philosophy of openness, knowledge is thought of as an open and cooperative enterprise with constitutive ethical roots.
ABSTRACT

The paper examines some very recent results obtained in the field of epigenetics according to which inheritance involves not only DNA, but also information (biological instructions) that regulates its expression. This means that epigenetic memory is essential for the development and survival of the new generations, since what we learn and know affects the growth of what we are in ontogenetic terms. This research leads us to revisit Waddington’s ancient intuitions dating back to the 1940s, concerning the plasticity of development, which laid the foundations for the elaboration of a new ontological reflection (metabiology) on the dynamic processes of living beings. This systemic approach seems to provide more adequate tools for studying the organismic dimension of living beings, as well as the emergence of evolving, self-organizing forms and functions.
ABSTRACT

The paper aims to show the philosophical relevance of the reading of Aristotle’s Rhetoric proposed by Heidegger during the course held in Marburg in 1924 (Grundbegriffe der Aristotelischen Philosophie). The main objective is not to discuss the philological correctness of Heidegger’s interpretation or the role that the course played in the development of Heidegger’s next thought. Rather, the intent is to show how and why the Heideggerian reading allows us to enhance the Aristotelian rhetoric in contemporary philosophical debate. The thesis argued is that the main strength of the Heideggerian reading of rhetoric is its ability to bring out, in line with the Aristotelian perspective, the interweaving of body, language and sociality in the human being.
ABSTRACT

The paper aims to reconstruct and analyze the model established by Kant between 1784 and 1797 concerning the Church-State relationship. We will start by considering Kant’s essays of 1784, in order to understand why the conflict between the public and private use of reason particularly affects the figure of the clergyman. Then, we will show that Kant’s view on the relationship between Church and State expresses the necessity for the ethical community to keep together two apparently conflicting aspects: the unconditioned necessity of each member to follow the interior moral legislation, and the conditioned necessity to play a role in the political community as a juridical subject. Finally, we will focus on how Kant’s model, insofar as it is shaped by the concept of reconciliation, could be taken as either positively or negatively paradigmatic for two key authors of German idealism, namely, Fichte and Hegel.
ABSTRACT

This paper on the early works of Hegel focuses on the development of the different features of the concept of fate and its relation to reason, love and life. The concept of fate has often been investigated, but Hegelian studies have focused particularly on the Frankfurt period, and little on the Tübingen period and even less on the Bern period. Fate/ dialectic does not suddenly appear in Frankfurt but is a result of a path of theoretical development. Perhaps fate was conceived by Hegel as the first expression of dialectic, because from the start it contained in itself the fundamental element of the removal of the finite from its separation from the whole, and therefore of the submission of the finite.
This article examines different interpretations of Gadamer’s sentence Das Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache with the objective of highlighting both the ontological difference between Being and beings and the speculative identity of Being and language. The argumentation will be introduced by a short consideration of Vattimo’s interpretation of Gadamer regarding the ontological difference and historicity. Through a critical and comparative analysis of a number of relevant contemporary positions (Rorty’s anti-essentialist nominalism, hermeneutical realism, hermeneutics of comprehension) the article will show how the identity of Being and language has been misinterpreted, even when acknowledged. In conclusion, a Hegelian approach will be employed in order to shed new light on Gadamer’s sentence and on the speculative identity of Being and language.
ABSTRACT

The present and future of metaphysics in the 21st century: in the book edited by Enrique Romerales some world-class metaphysical philosophers confront each other and converse with us about what metaphysics is today. Analytical and continental philosophers show some considerations on the general and particular topics of metaphysics: e.g. what is the relationship between metaphysics and ontology? What advances can there be in reflection of metaphysics? The answers are very different but all the authors share the conviction that metaphysics is inescapable: the center of philosophical thought is metaphysics. The papers contained in the book offer the chance to examine and reflect upon such matters as: hermeneutical ontology, allism and noneism, metaphysical retractatio, topology etc.