

**Struttura e livelli ontologici del reale. Nunzio Incardona e il suo tempo**

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INTORNO ALLA NOZIONE FENOMENOLOGICA DI REALTÀ

(pp. 216-239)

**ABSTRACT**

*The essay reconstructs Husserl's analyses concerning the themes of reality, highlighting how this investigation appears in connection with transcendental structure of phenomenology. Starting from an opening phase of metaphysical neutrality, the question of reality has in fact a real phenomenological meaning only in the context of transcendental phenomenology, namely with reference to the constitutive themes of functioning intentionality, disclosed by the phenomenological reduction. I argue that the transcendental phenomenology thematizes the correlation between subjectivity and world. Consequently, the phenomenological reflection does not dissolve the reality into the consciousness and does not eliminate idealistically the belief in the transcendent existence of reality, but justifies such belief in terms of a realism that is in accordance with the conditions of the possibility of phenomenological experience, which however are very different from those of Kant's empirical realism. Through the attempt to understand and account for the realism that is intrinsic to the natural attitude, Husserl contrasts the countersense of the dogmatic objectivism, assuming a kind of realism that appears able to successfully oppose the sceptical challenge.*

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EVENTUALISMO DEGLI ALCUNCHÉ E LIVELLI DEL REALE  
(pp. 240-256)

## ABSTRACT

*In this paper an ontological conception is presented that is called eventualism of somethings. In the first part, on one side, the distinction is formulated between somethings considered within a perspective of the subject and those outside it; on the other, the nature of somethings is analyzed on the basis of the principium individuationis, the notions of mass and volume and those of space and time. These notions make it possible to affirm that a something is considered such only if it is maintained in time and space and if the relationships are preserved between the masses that constitute it. In the subsequent part there are analyzed the relationships that every something can have with others in space-time. On the basis of this analysis some characteristics and aspects of somethings are considered: topicality, out-datedness and eventuality, which are the fundamental notions of the eventualist conception. In the final part two forms of eventuality are analyzed: primary archetypical eventuality, which sets aside from any subject, and perspective eventuality, which involves a subject or an observer. On the latter there is founded perspective eventualism, according to which every something is possible and perspectively infinite. Finally, in the light of eventualism of somethings the theme of the levels of reality is briefly examined.*

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L'ESSERE, IL DOVER ESSERE, L'ORIGINARIO  
(pp. 257-265)

## ABSTRACT

*Against Heideggerian criticism there is vindicated the legitimacy of the distinction between the order of being and the order of having to be, a distinction that accounts for moral experience. Indeed, it can be supposed that philosophy is born precisely from the tension between the two orders. With an appeal to Kant there is then affirmed the demand for their unity in an original principle, which can be only an absolute liberty that, positing being, also assigns its law to it, which is the moral law. The distinction between the three orders of reality also implies different forms of knowledge: knowledge of facts is objectivizing knowledge, while knowledge of having to be and that of the original is hermeneutic knowledge.*

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FENOMENI BEN FONDATI. NOTE SUL REALISMO DI KANT  
(pp. 266-278)

## ABSTRACT

*Kant's transcendental method identifies in the reference to a world outside us the background starting from which the sensitive impressions that are given to the mind can take on a determined meaning for us; the fact is that perceptions without world would be perceptions that fill our minds with objects that we could never recognize as such and to which we could not, in general, refer any meaning, so that there would be no difference between a mind full of objects and a mind reduced to tabula rasa.*

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LA RINASCITA DELLA METAFISICA DALLO SPIRITO DELLA LOGICA. LIVELLI ONTOLOGICI E LIVELLI  
SEMANTICI  
(pp. 279-304)

## ABSTRACT

*In recent analytic philosophy there has been a resurgence of metaphysics, and it is not difficult to see that this resurgence is strictly connected to the developments of logic. In his lectures on analytic philosophy, of 1976, Ernst Tugendhat suggested that the “new logic” created by Frege and Russell contained new and decisive resources for ontology. So recent developments have somehow confirmed this insight. The first part of the article updates and radicalizes Tugendhat’s hypothesis, focusing on what really in “logic” (classically intended as the study of validity “in virtue of form”) gives the conditions of the study of “being qua being”. It is shown that the metaphysical “spirit” of logic is typically Aristotelian, which means: alethic, and realistic; but truth and realism are intended in a light and liberalized way: they correspond to a methodological rather than substantive choice. The second part tries to apply the conclusions of the previous analysis to the problem of ontological “levels”. It is argued that the existence of levels is semantically revealed by typological and conceptual stratifications and hierarchies. But there is no alethic need of moving from semantic to metaphysical evidence: the world might only consist of the entities postulated by physics, and so “being” might be conceived as unique, univocal, one-level, and truth would work well.*

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ONTOLOGIA DELLA COSA SPIRITUALE  
(pp. 305-319)

## ABSTRACT

*In a spiritual ontology, the corporeal implications of experience cannot indeed be “objectivated”. A cultural object, for instance a work of art, can never be grasped as a mere series of causes and effects, as the processes leading to its production and reception can be described within a motivational chain, not aiming at providing an “explanation”, but rather at detecting those acts through which value judgements are given, as well as the cultural and teleological value of the phenomenon. Finally, not every object reveals its essence going back to its “mental” and corporeal roots. They can “resist” such an interpretation as they refuse to be connected to quantitative schemes, definite images, explanatory paths and cerebral processes. Their motivations, the complexity of the layers of meaning presiding over their reception or production, should be questioned again and again from an “historical” point of view by “historical” bodies. They therefore reveal to an objective eye and to exclusively mental bodies some extrinsic cognitive aspects, that end up being assimilated to objectual features from which instead they should possibly be told apart. This would lead us to believe that the methodological model should change according to the point of view and to the methodological and scientific aim; the philosopher does not aim at “explaining”, but rather at showing differences, defining methodological premises, and clearly stating that the point of view must change according to what the object is, that means according to the “reducibility” of its qualities to several points of view.*

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PENSIERO E REALTÀ. LA PROBLEMATIZZAZIONE DEL RAPPORTO FRA SOGGETTO E MONDO IN KANT E  
HEGEL

(pp. 320-354)

## ABSTRACT

*In the present contribution the author will take issue with the simplistic view that understands the philosophical movement that goes from Kant to Hegel as a form of “subjectivist idealism” - the latter being a philosophical theory according to which the reality of the world is entirely absorbed within the framework of subjectivity, making the world nothing but a construction of the thinking subject. Both Kant’s and Hegel’s philosophies are, on the contrary, the radical attempt to save the world from being reduced to a projection, construction or appearance made up by the subject. The radical nature of these attempts lies in the fact that they are at the same time committed to the following claim: the epistemic structures of subjectivity are far from being alien to the inner structures of reality. This proximity is rather the very condition of possibility for a subject to access the world, and a fortiori for a true knowledge of the world itself.*

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L'ONTOLOGIA DELLA CONOSCENZA ORDINARIA  
(pp. 355-371)

## ABSTRACT

*All organisms are cognitive systems, and life itself owes its preservation to a cognitive process. Such a process produces the biological knowledge, which is constituted by information relating to the external world or our own body. In humans the biological knowledge becomes much more complex than that of other animal species for the presence of the neocortex and the influence of sociocultural context: this kind of knowledge is called “ordinary knowledge”. In this paper I want to focus on the ontological structures of the world of ordinary knowledge. I argue that the ontological question of what there is, from the perspective of ordinary knowledge, is intricately bound to what can be perceived; indeed, the world of ordinary knowledge is made up of everyday objects experienced at the mesoscopic level.*



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SOGGETTO, INTERPRETAZIONE E MONDO IN HANS GEORG GADAMER

(pp. 372-386)

## ABSTRACT

*The paper presents the question concerning the relationship between subject and world in Gadamer's hermenutical thought. For the german thinker in the pair "having language"/"having world" is stated the subject's freedom both in its negative form as "being free from...", and in its positive rating, as building of sense. By discussing the linguistic dimension of the being-in-the-world it's possible to argue as in Gadamer's hermeneutics there is a fluctuation between two different levels of the question: on one hand the openness of the experience, its infinite being in progress, its unconcludedness and its "in fieri" identity; on the other hand the continuous, unwilled, reference to totality, to forms of absolute thought, to the self-consciousness which relates itself through itself.*

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LIVELLI DI REALTÀ E DESCRIZIONI DEL MONDO

(pp. 387-404)

## ABSTRACT

*I articulate and defend the following two claims: (i) it is a mistake to think that the structure of the world should mirror the structure of the theories by which we represent it, and through which we try to decipher it, simply because those theories appear to work; (ii) among the most deplorable consequences of this mistake is the widespread tendency to think that there must be a plurality of realities, or several different and irreducible levels of a stratified reality, merely because our credo includes a plurality of theories each of which appears to be as important and trustworthy as it is irreducible to (if not overtly in conflict with) the others.*

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SENSO O SENSI DELL'ESISTERE? I LIVELLI ONTOLOGICI DEL REALE NEL COSIDDETTO "TOMISMO ANALITICO"  
(pp. 405-428)

## ABSTRACT

*This article aims to present and discuss the position of some contemporary philosophers, classifiable within the so called "analytical Thomism". According to them existence has not only the sense of a second order predicate, that is to say a predicate of concepts – as maintained up to a few years ago by the majority of analytic philosophers followers of Russell's and Quine's "one sense theory" of existence – but also the sense of a first order predicate, namely a predicate of individuals. The reasons they bring in favour of such so-called "two sense theory" of existence stem from the semantic of natural languages, and from some suggestions by both Thomas Aquinas and Frege, whereas the criticisms against the "one sense theory" seek to demonstrate a vicious circle within the concept of "instantiation" typical of Russell/Quine's position. The article concludes pointing out some still open problems of the "two sense theory", which should be dealt with in order to make it not only interesting and plausible, as it is, but also coherent. An Appendix of the article clarifies and discusses the meta-philosophical category of "analytical Thomism".*

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NUNZIO INCARDONA E IL *SUO* TEMPO. AVVERTENZA  
(pp. 431-433)

## ABSTRACT

*Introduction to Nunzio Incardona's essay.*

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TEMPO E IDEA  
(pp. 434-486)

#### ABSTRACT

*Course in moral philosophy (1971-1972) about time conducted by Nunzio Incardona at the University of Palermo.*

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IL ROMANTICISMO DI NUNZIO INCARDONA

(pp. 487-494)

## ABSTRACT

*The thesis of this article is that the style of Nunzio Incardona's Philosophy has a deep romantic shape. He loves liberty, contradiction, existence, continual openness to the future and – at the same time – interiority and individual geniality. Also characteristic for the romantic attitude is the radicality of his thought, always in search of the principiality, and the relevance of his interest for the great problem of the negativity, in permanent discussion with the greatest representants of the history of philosophy.*

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ESISTENZA, TEMPO E PENSIERO. LA PROSPETTIVA DI NUNZIO INCARDONA  
(pp. 495-504)

## ABSTRACT

*The essay explores a moment of Nunzio Incardona's philosophical path in the early '70s, when the philosopher was looking for a way to develop the Selbstdenken. Incardona's analysis on the self-sufficiency of the existence works in this context as a critical principle that rules out subjectivist or activist solutions, as they oppose the activity of thought to the passivity of acknowledgment of the principle. For Incardona instead the way towards the Selbstdenken starts from the complexity of what he calls the assumption of the principle.*

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QUESTIONI DI PRINCIPIO. PENSARE CON NUNZIO INCARDONA  
(pp. 505-514)

## ABSTRACT

*Words as beginning, ground, origin – the words of Incardona's discourse – appear as terms of a speculative dictation that, far from tracing out the dogmatic pathway of a deductive development, instead feels the constant need to go back over its own steps, to re-examine itself each time according to an interrogation that digs in its own assumptions, its starting positions.*



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NUNZIO INCARDONA E IL «GIORNALE DI METAFISICA» (1982-2003)

(pp. 515-532)

## ABSTRACT

*The paper aims to highlight the contribution of ideas and projects that Nunzio Incardona made to philosophical culture in his years as the editor of the “Giornale di Metafisica.” An austere scholar aware of the task of continuing the thought of Michele Federico Sciacca, Incardona opened up the pages of the “Journal” to all the liveliest and most innovative forces, without ever asking for certificates of origin or affiliation. Accepting the demands of the most urgent problems, he transferred them to the fascicles of the “Giornale”, making it clear to others and to himself the reasons for his “labour” as a thinker and promoter of cultural events. An endeavour has been made to document this effort, to gather in a “virtuous” summary the substantial traits of Incardona’s painful but fruitful speculation.*

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NUNZIO INCARDONA (1928-2003). UN RICORDO  
(pp. 533-544)

## ABSTRACT

*On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of his death, the author of this paper gives a philosophical profile of Nunzio Incardona tracing out memories of him. His thought seems to focus on two essential points. On the one hand, moving à rebours from Hegel to Aristotle, he revisits the whole tradition of metaphysical thought, without forgetting to take into consideration his own insuperable aporias. On the other we clearly see that Incardona, in his critical analyses, persists in investigating the existential aspect of every philosophizing practice and the problematical relationship established between philosophy and religion. In particular he dwells on the latter subject in an important essay dedicated in 1990 to his friend Alberto Caracciolo.*

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APORIA DELLA CONTEMPORANEITÀ E MEDIEVALITÀ  
(pp. 545-562)

## ABSTRACT

*The paper that begins here is likely to be accidental and just ornamental in the architecture of a gesture that takes the urgency and depth from the memory, for a simple freedom of feeling and thinking. The subject of discussion is the relationship between contemporaneity and medievality. This speech accepts the necessity of assigning the mediation – between the two terms – to the aporia. Thus, the philosophy as a historically determined act of thinking is questioned peremptorily about its origin and its historical path, exposing itself as an act of initial oppositio. The author addresses all those who were and are for Nunzio Incardona “my pupils, hosàytos and not”. Moreover, he entrusts to them in primis this gloss as an isagoge for any additional concomitant quaestio about the relationship between medievality and vicariousness of the philosophy with respect to itself. Indeed, “philosophy begins if it is, hosàytos, in the same way, controfilosofia, because it is against its act of letting generate itself in that way”.*